7	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
1	
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAYAPAT
3	STATE OF ADIZONA
4	) JAN Z 8 2010 >
5	) JEANNE HICKS, Clerk ) BY Deputy
6	vs. No. CR 2008-1339
7	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,
8	Defendant. )
9	)
10	
11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG
12	JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION 6
13	YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA
14	PRESCOTT, ARIZONA
15	PRESCOTT, ARIZONA FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 2010 9:47 A.M. SESSION
16	
17	
18	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON PROCEEDINGS
19	<u>Hearing on Motions</u> Motion To Exclude Prior Act Evidence
20	Motion to Exclude Prior Act Evidence Motion Re: Photos
21	
22	
23	LISA A. CHANEY, RPR, CSR, CR
24	Certified Reporter Certificate No. 50801
25	ORIGINAL

January 15, 2010 9:37 A.M. 1 2 **APPEARANCES:** MR. JOE BUTNER, DEPUTY. FOR THE STATE: MS. DEB COWELL, PARALEGAL. 3 ALSO PRESENT: FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. JOHN SEARS, AND 4 MS. ANNE CHAPMAN. 5 6 THE COURT: Continuing with State versus 7 Steven DeMocker, CR 2008-1339. Mr. DeMocker is present with Ms. Chapman, Mr. Sears representing him. Mr. Bunter 8 9 is here from the county attorney's office representing the 10 State. 11 I had a chance to meet with the lawyers and 12 then the lawyers had a chance to meet with each other 13 regarding some of the remaining issues. I think where we 14 left off is in connection with the 404(B) motion and the last item on that that was still remaining is Number 6. 15 MR. SEARS: Thank you, Your Honor. Your 16 Honor, the last category of potential 404(B) evidence 17 18 that's been identified that hasn't been talked about yet 19 is whether the State should be allowed to present as 20 404(B) prior act evidence. 21 What you have heard about that they claim 22 constitutes evidence of a plan to flee the jurisdiction 23 prior to his arrest between the time of Miss Kennedy's 24 death on July 2nd and his arrest on October 23rd. 25 And to recap the principal portion of that

evidence consists of some books that Mr. DeMocker ordered over the internet dealing generally with topics about how to hide your identity. How to be an international fugitive and, in fact, the Court may have taken an opportunity to scan some of those. We brought some to Court at a prior hearing.

The State also has evidence that Mr. DeMocker had at the time of his arrest at his apartment in Scottsdale a motorcycle and some camping gear, GPS maps, and similar items and the State has wired all of that together in this with some statements from other people who claimed to have some information from Mr. DeMocker about what he was planning to do to say that he was planning to flee.

And apparently the argument that they would make, since he obviously didn't flee, on the day he was arrested he was sitting at his desk at work where he was expected to be. Our expectation is, the reason we filed this motion is that the State at some point in time will try to argue that only a guilty person would make these plans and do these things and that it is evidence of his consciousness of his own guilt in this case.

If you look at 404(B) no where in the exceptions to the general rule that such acts are inadmissible is something called consciousness of guilt.

The State may argue that its part of some evidence of plan or knowledge or absent of mistake or accident, but the fact is what they really want to do with this evidence is to infer from circumstances that Mr. DeMocker must be guilty and that because he was doing these things, it means and can only mean, that he was doing these things because he knew that he needed to get away before he was apprehended.

And you'll also remember that we've had evidence in this case that a relatively short period of time before Mr. DeMocker was arrested an article appeared in the Prescott Courier that seemingly was planted by the sheriff's office indicating that according to the sheriff himself that an arrest was eminent in this, at that time point an unsolved homicide case and that they were waiting for the result of one blood test and when that came in an arrest would be made.

It seems to us and did at the time that knowing that the only likely suspect was Mr. DeMocker at that point in time that this was an effort to spook Mr. DeMocker into running, and it certainly didn't. As we pointed out in hearings before you on our motion for modification of release conditions, in fact, Mr. DeMocker stayed put and was exactly where every one expected him to be on the day he was arrested.

Mr. DeMocker also made some statements to the police on October 23rd after he was arrested when asked directly about these books and said, in essence, that it was stupid and fear based on his part.

So you have this evidence and you have the way the State wants to use it. There is also circling around the possibility that the State might ask this Court to instruct the jury about both consciousness of guilt and/or flight or concealment. Well, since there was no flight or concealment, I don't think they would ever be entitled as a matter of law to an instruction on that.

On the other hand, the State if not restrained pursuant to Rule 404(B) would simply throw this out of their case in chief as one more of this never ending list of things that they have developed in their investigation that just is an attempt to show that Mr. DeMocker is a man of bad character and bad behavior.

And I want to be clear, again, as I tried to be yesterday, that we see a difference between the use of such evidence and such acts of the Defendant as impermissible character evidence against him and we are not suggesting that on some other theory the State might attempt to bring forth the same evidence.

A 404(B) motion is simply to ferret out, identify, and deal with what we think is clearly character

evidence, and if it's character evidence in the guise of something else, than the Court needs to make that determination here today, but we think that based on what we understand the evidence to be, and what we heard the State say both in writing in this case and through disclosure in hearings before this Court, is simply one more effort to dirty up Mr. DeMocker in the eyes of the jury.

And under 404(B) we see no such exception to this conduct that would allow it to come in on that theory and on another day, at another time, if the State has a different theory of admissibility of evidence, we'll take it up at that point. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Well, Judge, this is not character evidence. The Defendant's admission that his actions in acquiring these materials, books, and food stuff and a motorcycle and so forth in preparation to flee, his admission that this was stupid and fear based, that's pretty accurate and that's exactly what it demonstrates is his knowledge.

His knowledge at the time that and his evidence of consciousness of guilt. Knowledge equals consciousness of guilt. That's what knowledge is, consciousness. You're aware of something. You know about

it. And this is very strong evidence that he knew he was guilty in this case and he was getting ready to flee on the basis of fear that he was going to get caught and the consequences that he could sustain as a result of that clearly demonstrates his intent to flee and this is entirely permissible evidence.

This is not 404(B) evidence. This is not character evidence. This is not evidence of other crimes. This is evidence of the crime that's before this tribunal at this point in time. Its evidence that this Defendant committed the crime. He knew he committed the crime and knew that he needed to get away in order to avoid the consequences of getting caught.

THE COURT: In terms of what you think of the evidence that this section of the motion is dealing with, if we might take up the ordering and delivery of books pertaining to issues of hiding identity.

MR. BUTNER: Correct.

THE COURT: Certain items on the computer as regard to that, in terms of the acts, the obtaining of a second passport.

MR. BUTNER: Correct.

THE COURT: The possession of motorcycle with the side bags that contained food stuff, GPS location map, having to do with the Republic of Mexico.

MR. BUTNER: Exactly. 1 THE COURT: The statements made with regard to 2 3 what that stuff was for, that those are all items within 4 the category you say evidence exists for that item, 5 anything else that I have already heard that pertains to this category in general? 6 7 MR. BUTNER: There's evidence that he had a pistol right there with that stuff, a couple of clips, and 8 9 also there's evidence that his daughter Charlott was 10 concerned about this and had a -- a diary entry, I 11 believe, or a letter, a written memorandum, so to speak, 12 from Charlott concerning the fact that she was afraid that 13 her dad was getting ready to leave and she knew that and 14 this evidence, of course, is also I believe admissible for 15 all of those kinds of things. 16 THE COURT: Anything else that you feel you need to refresh my memory of what this particular grouping 17 18 is --19 MR. BUTNER: I can't think of anything 20 further. THE COURT: -- offered? 21 MR. BUTNER: Of course, photos of all of those 22 23 things. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Sears, any other items that you think would fit within the category that you're trying 25

There

1 to preclude? MR. SEARS: No, that's a pretty descriptive 2 list but I think that we need to try and remember, because 3 4 it's been talked about in a number of different hearings, what the actual evidence presented by the State about 5 these things are. 6 7 Beginning with the statements that Mr. DeMocker made when he was arrested. It was clear, and 8 9 I think there is no dispute, that those statements were in 10 response to questions about the books. The police were 11 not questioning him about the motorcycle or the camping gear or the handgun or any of those other things. 12 13 The diary entry, the journal entry, in Mr. DeMocker's daughter's diary was dated August 17th of 14 Nine weeks later he's still in Arizona. 15 2008. passport application we've heard a lot of about when 16 Mr. Ainley had the case and that was done within a few 17 days after. 18 THE COURT: Seizure of his original passport 19 and other items? 20 21 MR. SEARS: At the time he was arrested. Thev 22 had everything. They had his driver's license, credit 23 card. THE COURT: Vehicle --24

25

MR. SEARS: All of those others things.

was a question about whether he made a false statement in the application, as the Court has heard, but just the fact of applying for a passport in that context which the State did not dispute that he was doing those other things is something else.

The State ran -- did not seize for some reason but ran the serial number on the handgun and determined that Mr. DeMocker had owned that handgun for about ten years and was bought at Bucky O'Neil's gun shop here in Prescott and was lawfully possessed.

The motorcycle in question that Mr. DeMocker had was his means of transportation. Remember that the police took his automobile, which they still have all of these months later, leaving him with no transportation and Mr. DeMocker needed something to get around on and had a motorcycle.

The testimony about these facts to the extent that they are facts, is one thing. The problem that 404(B) anticipates is the way in which it would be used and if the State wants to argue, as it would in their case in chief, that the constellation of circumstances here means that Mr. DeMocker was going to flee, not simply because he knew he was guilty, but because he was a continuing bad character, that would do something terrible and then, rather, than stand up and face whatever was

coming would run away, that's a separate character trait. Running away from trouble that has implications in the real world and we can't forget that what we're talking about is what the jury would hear and what would or would not be allowed to be argued to the jury.

And it is a particularly bad character trait, I would suggest for a jury to hear that somebody, particularly if they're innocent, as in this case, would run away and hide, rather than stand up and confront what was happening.

So that's the way in which we think 404(B) is is implicated in this case. The other problem is that if the State is allowed to raise this and argue it, it puts additional pressure on Mr. DeMocker to waive his fifth amendment privilege and testify his own defense in this case because not doing that would make that argument in large part unrebutted and I understand that that can come up in a lot of different contexts but, particularly, if highly prejudicial information comes in in that purpose leaving Mr. DeMocker with the hostes choice of waiving his right and testifying to explain what he was really doing and thinking or asserting his privilege against not testifying is unfair.

Remember that for the 404(B) analysis we have to prove by clear and convincing evidence this these acts

occurred, have to determine whether or not they fit within any of the 404(B) exceptions, but then, they have to be relevant and they have to be free from the kind of unfair prejudice to the Defendant that Rule 403 discusses and I think that even if you hopscotch your way through all of those other steps and end with the 403(B) analysis, that's the principal prejudice to Mr. DeMocker.

It allows the State to circulate a theory in this case of highly prejudicial information to dirty up Mr. DeMocker and leaving him with very few options about how to respond to it because these are so personal to him there's really no one else that can speak to what Mr. DeMocker was thinking and planning other than Mr. DeMocker and, of course, the constitution protects him from having to do that in this case.

So I think that when you analyze this evidence with that lens of 404(B) and what this is really being offered for, that's the problem.

THE COURT: I think that I interrupted your argument, Mr. Butner, in asking a question about what other items of evidence or prior testimony are implicated by this, so if we could get back to you.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, just to kind of clarify the gun that he had, the gun was right there with all of the stuff ready to go apparently to Mexico with the GPS devices and he also had a rented car. This wasn't his sole form of transportation, this motorcycle. So that's -- basically those are the facts and the photographs of the acquisition of all of those things ready to go. THE COURT: Okay. Any other argument that you want to make on this? MR. BUTNER: No. No, that's sufficient, Your

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Any other summation that you want to give on the ones that I haven't made any decisions about so far? Obviously, we've had some degree of meeting of the minds or I've entered orders concerning some of the 11 but as far as what remains, any summation that you want to give?

MR. SEARS: Very briefly, Your Honor. Item Number 3, the computer searches, as we indicated yesterday having moved through disclosure and hearings in this case it seems to us apparent now that any argument that the State might want to make that would somehow tie those computer searches to the way in which this killing actually took place, is improbable at best.

And if you subtract that improbability out of this equation what you're left with then is the simple fact that the State would like the jury to know that the Defendant in a vacuum was looking at this kind of

information.

It again puts the burden back on the Defendant to testify in his own defense, waive his fifth amendment privilege and explain what he was really looking at in this case. It's no longer relevant which is the middle prong of this analyst.

It's no longer relevant that he may have been looking at -- even if you give the State their theory which, of course, we're not prepared to do, but assuming for purposes of this argument, the State is correct that Mr. DeMocker was not researching a book, that he was interested in killing somebody, trying to connect that up this way to this crime with the disconnect that is created between what these searches are about and what they are not about and what happened to Carol Kennedy on July 2nd of 2008, just seems -- just seems to speak for itself.

It seems that the State would be hard pressed to make that argument. The State has said several times including yesterday that all of these computer searches mean that Mr. DeMocker is planning on killing somebody and it must then be Carol Kennedy and then abandons all -- whatever his plan was in favor of killing her in her own home on an evening when no one would know who was present and who was coming over while she's speaking on the telephone to her mother with some sort of object that

created a blunt force trauma.

The difference between that and this supposedly planned and calculated thing is -- couldn't be more striking and you have rejected and removed from this case the cold and calculating argument in aggravation for penalty purposes, and I think for good reason, that one does not follow the other.

And when you do that and there's no reason for the State to argue that the only logical conclusion about their reason for using this evidence, is they just want the jury to know as many bad things about Mr. DeMocker as they can bring up.

THE COURT: Thank you. Any summation that you want to give on the remaining other act evidence?

MR. BUTNER: Judge, in regard to that computer search let me more clearly explain, I think, it's relevant because it demonstrates that the Defendant was thinking about killing someone and was looking for methods to do that without getting caught, that's what the gist of that research is.

And then a further review of that same research demonstrates that this wasn't for a book as the explanation has been offered but rather he has gone so far as to take the step of getting an employee identification number so that he could acquire the materials necessary in

order to do the killing.

What we have here is a plan to kill someone. We can't tell from what's in the computer as to exactly who the target is but then as events develop, a mere couple of months later, the financial pressure greatly increases and then Mr. DeMocker abandons that plan that he was researching to kill Carol Kennedy, and goes out and takes matters literally directly into his own hands and kills her on the evening of July the 2nd, 2008.

So he's planning to kill her, Judge, in one way and he ultimately changes his mind and kills her in a different way, but it's still a plan to kill Carol Kennedy.

THE COURT: What's the hookup? What's the connection between obtaining an employee identification number and possible acquisition of carbon monoxide? Remind me from the evidence, if you can or if you would, if one of the research items was killing somebody via carbon monoxide or is there a connection, in other words, what was researched vis-a-vis carbon monoxide gas to the actual possible acquisition of carbon monoxide?

MR. BUTNER: That's my recollection, Judge. I can't point to something specifically other than the area where it says, how to kill somebody and make it look like an accident, that's really the connection with the carbon

1 | monoxide.

THE COURT: Is there reference within any -- my question to be a little bit more precise is, was there a connection between what was researched and following up on that general search to carbon monoxide?

MR. BUTNER: I believe so. I think it was a connection where you can kill somebody and make it look like an accident if you get them in a confined space, of course, typically something, you know, that causes their automobile to directly pump carbon monoxide into the passenger compartment of the vehicle with insufficient ventilation to allow for fresh air. Usually, of course, that's done in a garage or something like that, but I think that area of inquiry about how to make it look like an accident, that encompasses a number of different methods that that can be accomplished.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. Any other items that you want to summary that you want to make?

MR. BUTNER: I don't think so, Judge. I think that we've clearly put the position before the Court on the remainder of the items.

MR. SEARS: If I could be heard briefly?

THE COURT: Mr. Sears, on which issue?

MR. SEARS: Still on Number 3. Our recollection of the evidence was that the search was

actually how to kill somebody and make it look like it's suicide in this case and I think that's an even clearer case of the golf between this online research, which the Court will also remember was very brief, the times spent in these cites were a matter of seconds and no hard copies or downloaded copies of this information have been produced, that I'm aware of in the evidence in this case, other than searches -- forensic searches by the State's computer people pulling up fragments of web pages that had been looked at by Mr. DeMocker.

And so to extrapolate from that that Mr.

DeMocker was carefully planning an undetectable murder of Carol Kennedy from that evidence is a stretch, when weighed against the obvious prejudice of the Defendant of just the names of some of these searches and the requirement that the Defendant to defend his character against this sort of attack in this case.

It would be a different thing if the searches were relevant to the way in which Miss Kennedy was killed. This is like saying if Mr. DeMocker spent too much time watching true crime shows on television or reading pulp fiction novels about these things, then clearly he's thinking about killing somebody, and that the only person that he could be thinking about is Carol Kennedy.

And the State then has to drag in this

financial pressure boiling point theory that they've advanced through Mr. Echols and Mr. Casalena in this case to get you there and in a vacuum this evidence is 404(B) and creates a terrible prejudicial affect for Mr. DeMocker.

All I can say, Your Honor, on Matters 4 and 5, without revisiting every bit of that, is simply to say that in his divorce Mr. DeMocker was not making false statements or misleading statements about the Book of Business, just to the contrary. He took an open position. It was seriously debated in plain view of everyone and it was Mr. Casalena that developed this theory that there was of Book of Business and had a particular value and that was communicated back to Mr. DeMocker and he on the advise of his lawyer rejected that idea and to somehow characterize that has false and misleading is utterly at odds with what the evidence was here and what the reality was in the divorce case.

And by the same token suggesting that he was then hiding something seems to be a complete mischaracterization. He could not have been more transparent, more open about what he was doing on this point if he had tried. He turned over all of the information. They had everything they needed to know and if you remember there was an e-mail that we've seen now

after the fact that, of course, wasn't disclosed during the divorce where Mr. Casalena downplayed to his client, Carol Kennedy, the likelihood of success on this, coupled with a request for more money to come up.

And try and do it, and a conscious decision was made by Miss Kennedy with her attorney to abandon this claim at trial, not just for purposes of settlement, but to abandon at trial and to say that it appears again in the divorce decree gives it credence that there was a Book of Business is not consistent with Anna Young's testimony in this case that it was there just to preclude some late argument that it had been over look or omitted.

If you went back extracted from the divorce settlement the relevant values of all of the assets, there's no 600,000 or \$800,000 discrepancy between the value of what Mr. DeMocker was awarded and the value of what Miss Kennedy was awarded by way of their settlement,.

Had there been I don't think that Mr. Fruge and/or Carol Kennedy would have signed off on a settlement that was so one-side, and I think quite tellingly, you never hear again, ever, a word about the Book of Business from Miss Kennedy.

She's complaining about other loose ends up to the very last minute about things that she wants to hang on to and those things but there's no suggestion that the

Book of Business was an issue in her mind. There is no motion for relief filed by her or by anybody else or Mr. Fruge. There's no communications that show up on her computer from Mr. Fruge saying, you know, we got hoodwinked about this Book of Business by Mr. DeMocker.

It was just a position taken in the divorce case that was thoroughly argued and considered by both sides and resolved, and it can't be any simpler than that.

And then to allow the State to continue this unsupported, unwarranted attack on Mr. DeMocker for, you know committing perjury, which is the most -- I think is the most extreme position they took to these allegations that he's committing fraud, that he's misleading the Court, and that he's hiding something, is utterly inappropriate under 404(B) and needs to be blocked right now. So we would ask you to remember all of those things in making a ruling on that. Thank you. I am done.

THE COURT: Generally under Rule 404(A), as you know, evidence of a person's character or trait of character is not admissible for purposes of proving action and conformity. 404(B) provides that except as provided in 404(C), which doesn't apply in this particular case, evidence of other crimes or wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove character of a person in order to show action and conformity therewith.

It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as, proof of motive, opportunities, and preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or absence, that is not an exhaustive list of all the purposes for which such evidence may be admitted.

And I readily acknowledge that the act itself has to be proven by clear and convincing evidence for it to be admissible, and then also there's a general relevancy determination is this evidence itself relevant and does it have reason being excluded for purposes of prejudice confusion or waste of time.

So that is the analysis and I do have testimony to rely on. I think that I need some review personally of some the computer evidence to be absolutely certain of my ruling in connection with that, but here's my general ruling and observation.

Premeditation is a portion of what the State must prove in connection with the computer searches that bear on the topic of killing and, I guess, I do have a comment about whether this implicates some kind of demand or potential demand by the jurors for Mr. DeMocker to testify or an undue pressure on him to testify.

I think there is plenty of evidence in the record without Mr. DeMocker testifying that would allow this defense to make an argument that this is something

that is researched for a book based on the files in which the witnesses for the State would have to admit that existed on the computer.

So I guess I disagree with the perception that this would be some kind of undue pressure on the Defendant to have to rebut but I don't disagree with the observation about one of the retrieved items under a general search, was even the smallest things can attack, and that that had reference to a joke cite or that sort of thing.

So in terms of bringing that information before a jury I don't find that the fifth amendment of rights would be unnecessarily implicated. It's acknowledged by I suspect by both sides that whoever killed Carol Kennedy may have premeditated it to some degree at least at the time of executing the blows and observation about -- at least my recollection of the facts, I find that the fact of the research existed and existed on Mr. DeMocker's own computer and that there is sufficient evidence with regard to identity of who is doing the search.

I think the real argument becomes more for what was being searched for and for what purpose and was it to write a book and that sort of thing. The fact is that the research took place and I find by clear and convincing evidence that that research took place and that

Mr. DeMocker did it based on the evidence before me. I think that more to the point -- and I do find that it fits within the type of information for which it's admissible under 404(B) for purposes of knowledge, motive, plan. And the question I think comes down to relevancy and to the degree of probative value being out weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading of the jury.

I think, therefore, based on my recollection of the evidence that the evidence with regard to how to kill and make it look like a suicide is admissible.

With regard to the specific research and the evaluation or obtaining of employee identification number as it relates to carbon monoxide when that's not connected to the manner of killing in this case and it's not in my recollection connected otherwise to the search, I think it would put it outside the bounds of the evaluation of the probative value versus prejudice resulting, and it carries the additionally implication of an attack on the honest or truthfulness of the Defendant in a fashion where it hasn't been raised as a defense or an element of character.

So at least in the case in chief I think that the obtaining of an employee -- employer identification number or application for receipt of carbon monoxide canisters and the research connected to carbon monoxide with regard to that, I find at this time that for the

State's case in chief that evidence should be excluded by the danger of unfair prejudice compared to the probative value of that.

2.4

I think that the other evidence of research is admissible and relevant and is free of the danger of the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial evidence as is discussed in Rule 403. I find that that issue does not present itself. There's not a danger of unfair prejudice as compared to the probative value. So that's Number 3.

I may want to revisit that after I examine the transcript and my notes with regard to what was testified to about the computer search. That would be my ruling at this time.

With regard to the Book of Business and that information which is in Number 4 and Number 5 according to what the parties have asserted that's talking about the fact of filing of financial documents. It is a fact. It's a judicial noticeable fact because I've looked at the domestic relations file. In looking at the domestic relations file the characterization of those as false and misleading is not something that I believe can be made. I've already made findings of that in connection with my findings on the Chronis hearing.

The statements in that sense are not hidden from the parties or hidden in real terms from the Court.

These are items that were disclosed. They were negotiated, negotiated, in a fairly heated fashion or and substantial fashion.

2.4

I find that there was a negotiated settlement that addressed the issues of the Book of Business and awarded those to the Defendant to the extent that the retiring agents' agreement was involved. I note that it was never signed or at least I haven't been presented with a copy if it was and so I don't think that the evidence concerning false and misleading statements is admissible. I'm going to disallow that.

I find clear and convincing evidence of the financial report that Mr. DeMocker made and that Mrs. DeMocker -- Miss Kennedy made in their presentations to the divorce court, so clearly those occurred. And I've -- again, they may pertain to a pecuniary motive and to that extent fit within the exception for the item itself to be admitted and I find that they're free of 403 prejudice and not probative to that point and relevant Mr. Casalena and Mr. Echols notwithstanding and their testimony notwithstanding.

So to the extent that this evidence is characterized as false and misleading I reject that to the extent that it's admissible to give a financial picture, I accept that and would allow the offering of the exhibit.

1 Exhibits that are related to the financial condition of the parties in May -- in March or July 2 essentially of 2008 but not with regard to the 3 characterization that these are what was filed by the 4 5 Defendant are false and misleading. Does that make sense? 6 7 MR. SEARS: Yes, Your Honor. 8 MR. BUTNER: Yes, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Number 6. 10 MR. SEARS: Before we jump to Number 6, is it also your order the State may not assert that these 11 12 documents or any other document constitutes evidence that 13 Mr. DeMocker was hiding this asset, this asset, being the 14 Book of Business? 15 Mr. Butner, do you want to be THE COURT: heard with regard to what arguments can be made on that? 16 17 MR. BUTNER: I think that I've made them. 18 Judge. 19 THE COURT: I would restrict the State's ability to make an argument that he's hiding assets when, 20 in fact, that's a negotiated item, since I've been told by 21 22 the State that the only reference in that category of 23 information had to do with the Book of Business, and I 24 find that that was not hidden from Miss Kennedy or her

counsel and was a subject of negotiated settlement, in

fact, between Mr. DeMocker his attorney Miss Kennedy and her attorney.

MR. SEARS: Thank you.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: The evidence under the category

Number 6 I think that I've -- I think I've addressed and

confirmed with both counsel what that particular evidence
involved.

I will find there to be clear and convincing evidence that Mr. DeMocker ordered books, that the books. in fact, were delivered to his office, that these books pertained to hiding identity or going on the lamb, so to I found -- had evidence earlier presented of his speak. obtaining of a passport, had evidence of his having a motorcycle that was equipped with camping gear and food and a GPS map of the Republic of Mexico, and recalled there to be -- I recall it in a context of an entry in the diary of his daughter and to the extent that that evidence is -- maybe obtained through laying foundation of it being her writing and conclusions it could come in in that fashion. So I do have evidence of those things occurring and I also have evidence that Mr. DeMocker was still at his desk and working and found still in the area.

The Court finds clear and convincing evidence that establishes that those acts occurred. I think that those acts do go to a permitted purpose under 404(B) in

terms of knowledge and motivation and consciousness of 1 2 guilt. It's an argument that could be made. There are obviously counter arguments can be made to the evidence 3 4 that is presented. 5 I think with the proper instruction the jury is the one fact finder that makes that determination. 6 7 long goes as the evidence is found to be clear and convincing, fits within one of the exceptions, which I 8 9 find both of those prongs that it's relevant and not 10 unfairly prejudicial compared to the probative value. 11 So I think that type of evidence does fit within, and that specific evidence, does fit within those 12 13 requirements under 404(B) so I would allow Number 6 as I think that covers the other acts that you asked 14 15 me to address at this time. 16 MR. SEARS: I believe that's correct. Your 17 Honor. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Butner. MR. BUTNER: I believe so too, Judge. 19 20 THE COURT: We had left Number 9 of the pending motions and do we have some other motions that are 21 22 still pending that you think we need to address before taking up the photographs? 23 24 MR. SEARS: I think we have still been discussing our motion for adoption of jury questionnaire 25

and jury selection plan, that if you think you would benefit from more discussion of that we're more than happen to do so, but as we said earlier this week, for any number of reasons, not the least of which is trying to plan space availability and such things, we would encourage the Court to move quickly on the decision making I think we've gone through and flyspecked the on this. questionnaire.

THE COURT: I think I'm going to hold on that for the time being and go through that this weekend and give you what I think is -- give you a draft of where I think I am on the particular language of the questions and take that up when I see you next week.

MR. SEARS: That would be a good thing. And part of our motion, of course, is our, you know, we call it for lack of a better word, the protocol but the jury selection plan with dates and phases and a particular kind of Voir Dire is very important for us going forward to be ready to do that.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I can give you the 14th of April to be specific as to that issue given my other trial calendar. I may give you the 13th of April or some other time.

MR. SEARS: We just arbitrarily selected all of those dates and particularly with respect to the dates

for the Court to resolve some issues and for the defense and the prosecution to meet on these things we are flexible.

The reason that we picked those dates is we thought that it fit within the 30 daytime period between the beginning of the questionnaire process and the first day of trial.

THE COURT: Right. So in general terms I'm okay with the time frame that's laid out and I'm okay with doing a jury questionnaire. I have some qualms about the length of it simply because I wonder about the concentration of jurors or jury panel members and focusing on something like this but, nonetheless, I think that it's even important to learn about those things, and the primary issues that I had had to do with cost and logistics and somewhat on my availability for the week of, I guess, it's April 12th through 16th -- 12 through 16th because of the problem calender that I have.

So I'll let me go over that over the weekend and have a draft of where I would come down on those questions, where there is some dispute between parties, and recognizing the State's overall objection, and when we met next week or sometime prior to next week I may be able to e-mail you a copy of where I think I am on the questionnaire.

MR. SEARS: If I could move to the motion to 1 2 compel that we filed that the State still has time to 3 respond to. MR. BUTNER: Let's not move to that, 4 5 Mr. Sears. Can't we see if we can work that out? MR. SEARS: That's what I was about to say. 6 7 MR. BUTNER: Okay. I thought you were going to going to start arguing it. 8 9 MR. SEARS: No. 10 MR. BUTNER: Which we haven't had opportunity 11 to respond. MR. SEARS: I think that we're in reasonable 12 13 conversation with the State on this and we've gotten 14 already some of the requested material directly from the Sorenson Lab and to the extent that it is not resolved or 15 16 on track to be resolved it might be something that we 17 could take up after the State responds perhaps even next Friday when we're back here. I think that's a fair time 18 table in this case. 19 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. BUTNER: And speaking of next Friday, 22 Judge, I have been subpoenaed to testify in a hearing next 23 Friday at 9 o'clock Friday morning over -- I think its 24 over in the Verde. So in terms of me being here next

Friday, that's certainly a problem at least as far as the

1 morning goes. THE COURT: I think my Friday has something in 2 3 the afternoon, though, so which is why I put you in the 4 morning. MR. BUTNER: Mr. Fields is going to be 5 handling the morning discussion. I think the Court knew 6 7 that. 8 THE COURT: I think I knew that. 9 MR. BUTNER: I sure hope I'll be available in the afternoon. 10 THE COURT: I have a hearing at 2 o'clock on a 11 12 shooting case that I have that is coming up for trial the 13 4th of February. So 2 o'clock on the 22nd I have something else going. To the extent that we need to get 14 15 ahold of you and maybe even if you appear telephonically, 16 let's see if we can nail down the issue of the jury questionnaire. So at least for that purpose may be we can 17 18 set something at 1:30 before I start the other matter. 19 MR. SEARS: Are we changing the 9 o'clock 20 start on the hearing now? 21 THE COURT: No. Mr. Fields is covering that 22 apparently and so the 9 o'clock is still the start and 23 hoping that we will be done in the morning with that but I 24 guess we'll see.

MR. SEARS: Okay. There's one other matter,

Your Honor, which I think we may get an answer from the 1 2 State regarding before the court has to step in but we 3 have made a request of the State to forward letters to 4 Ruth Kennedy and John Kennedy, the victim's brother, and 5 that's based on some disclosure we received which was a transcript of a telephone call between Detective McDormett 6 and the Kennedys about whether they would or wouldn't 8 consent to a defense interview in this case. 9 THE COURT: Hold that thought for just a second. 10 11 MR. SEARS: I'm sorry. 12 THE COURT: Go ahead. Excuse me. 13 MR. SEARS: This is my understanding. Ms. Chapman has been speaking with Mr. Butner about this 14 but our understanding remains that they have declined to 15 16 be interviewed by the defense but there is still the confusing question of whether they would agree to be 17 18 disposed and I think that Mr. Butner needs to speak with 19 them and think he intends to do that and we need to know 20 at some point pretty soon here whether Mr. Butner will simply send our letters out to them. 21 22 So we would ask that by -- certainly by next Friday that we have a more complete understanding from the 23 24 State of what the victim's position is. I guess, maybe to 25 put this in a less -- Ms. Chapman tells me that I'm

garbling. 1 2 MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, what we primarily --THE COURT: Go ahead. Ms. Chapman. 3 4 MS. CHAPMAN: Thank you. What we primarily need to hear from the State is whether or not they intend 5 to and when they, in fact, do send the letters that we 6 7 have prepared to John and Ruth Kennedy. That's the first step. Are they going to send these letters? Have they 8 9 sent the letters? 10 We provided them to Mr. Butner on Tuesday and 11 I understand he hasn't made a decision about whether he 12 will send them so when that decision is made we'll need to 13 take it up with the Court. Hopefully it will be made by next Friday and we can address it at that time if we need 14 15 to. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Butner, appears to be ready to 17 tell us that. 18 MR. BUTNER: Well, actually I'm not ready, 19 Judge, I was trying to find the Victim Rights Statute and 20 look at it and see, that is the issue. I have through the 21 victim's service representative contacted the Kennedys 22 recently and asked if they would submit to a defense 23 interview. Their response was no. 24 I haven't spoken to them recently directly

about that issue. I had previously spoken with them about

that issue, you know, months ago and they didn't want to do a defense interview then when I personally spoke with them but I'll -- as I told Ms. Chapman, you know, I haven't had a chance to talk to them directly again, and I will do that. I wanted to make sure then from a legal point of view whether there was any problem with me forwarding on these letters.

I haven't looked at the letters. They're in -- I think they are in sealed envelopes. I'm not sure. I didn't even check to see if the envelops were sealed. I assumed they were, and so I just want to make sure that I was not somehow violating the Victim's Right Statute by passing on these sealed letters.

And then the other thing that had come up was this interview by Detective McDormett of Ruth Kennedy.

Ms. Chapman was kind enough to give me a copy of the transcript to the extent that one could be prepared of that interview because a lot of the responses to the questions from Detective McDormett were apparently inaudible, but in any event, that was simply suppose to be a relatively simple conversation about whether Ruth Kennedy would submit to a deposition.

And the reason being for a deposition her advanced age and there was concern as to whether she would be available at the time of trail and she indicated that

she would submit to a deposition and I think that's still probably her position, although, I haven't reconfirmed that recently either.

MS. CHAPMAN: And just to be clear, Your Honor, we have not asked for a deposition and we're not asking -- I'm not asking Mr. Butner to go back to Ruth Kennedy and John Kennedy and ask about an interview. We're asking that these letters be passed directly to them.

I think the statute constitutes that that's appropriate to go through Mr. Butner's office and that's how we initiated the communication given your ruling on the Victim Rights Acts Motion that we had submitted earlier.

And I -- there is specific reasons for doing that and that's why we provided that interview of what you could hear of it to Mr. Butner. I don't think we need to get into all of that if the letters are going to be passed on. So I suggest that we defer that conversation until we know from Mr. Butner whether he intends to do that.

THE COURT: All right. Then -- so you're going to have a conversation or communication with the Kennedys to find out if they are willing to receive that, first of all, and to do your own research on what you need to do with the letters --

1	MR. BUTNER: Exactly.
2	THE COURT: in the event that they do want
3	to receive it or don't want to receive it?
4	MR. BUTNER: Exactly, Judge.
5	THE COURT: All right. Can you get an answer
6	back to the defense with regard to those two items then
7	sometime within the next week before we meet next week?
8	MR. BUTNER: Yes. I think that the deadline
9	on Friday is entirely reasonable. I hope I'll have an
10	answer sooner than that but I've been kind of stretched
11	thin lately, you know.
12	THE COURT: No doubt. I know this isn't your
13	only case although
14	MR. BUTNER: It seems like it though.
15	THE COURT: sometimes it seems like it, and
16	maybe it should be. Now, I'll even say that much. If I
17	can do anything to assist you in that I would but I don't
18	think that my opinion on it would have any meaning for
19	your boss.
20	MR. BUTNER: No comment.
21	THE COURT: Yeah. So are we only dealing then
22	the only matter we have left this morning is the
23	photographs?
24	MR. SEARS: I believe that's correct, Your
25	Honor.

MR. BUTNER: I think so, Judge. 1 THE COURT: Perhaps because of what we said 2 3 earlier in the week -- the courtroom is free of media personnel -- so I think that we can discuss this in the 4 5 courtroom without -- no need -- I suppose we may want to reconfigure the setup of the courtroom if somebody comes 6 7 No need to do what was suggested by somebody at one 8 point to lockup the courtroom. I think that we can go ahead with it and as things currently stand, if somebody 9 10 chooses to join us where you think that there is an issue for us of dealing with that then I'll take a recess. 11 12 MR. SEARS: Thank you, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Do you want to take a recess now 14 or do you want to preempt the possibility of somebody 15 walking in on this and reconfigure and turn the table so 16 that so when you are looking at something somebody from 17 the back won't be looking over your shoulders? 18 MR. SEARS: Could we take a brief recess? 19 THE COURT: You want to reconfigure the 20 courtroom? 21 MR. SEARS: I'll help you do that too. I'11 22 be right back. 23 MR. BUTNER: That's a good idea. 24 THE COURT: Let's do that. 25 (Whereupon, a break was taken.)

THE COURT: Let's go back on the record. We have about 50 minutes or so to go through a lot of photographs and I'll reposition myself so that I can look at what you need me to look at.

We're dealing -- and Mr. DeMocker is still present, of course. Mr. Butner, for the State, and Miss Chapman, Mr. Sears for the defense.

We're dealing with the motion in limine concerning certain photographs. The motion filed December 22nd. State's response of January 4th. Defense reply January 8th. Everyone asked me to take a look at the photographs. Some I obviously have seen as part of Dr. Keen's testimony and other witnesses' testimony but I think that what counsel are proposing is that these not be admitted separately for purposes of today's hearing and marked with a court identification number.

Rather, I think what counsel wants me to do was take a look at those that are being proposed as a group from which the evidence items to be used at trial would be taken, not all of them -- of the photographs that I'm being shown would, in fact, be used, as I understand is the State's position, but some within the group will be used.

And I think that I was told at one point there was something on the order of a thousand photographs and,

1 clearly, Mr. Butner doesn't intend to use a thousand 2 photographs based on what he said earlier. 3 So if we can refer to the photos by the designations that you all have given which is -- or as the 4 sheriff's office has given which is calling a disk by a 5 particular letter and then the J Peg Number that goes 6 along with that, I think we can make a decent record about 8 what I'm looking at or allowing or disallowing. 9 Right. 10 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. Judge, I think that's entirely accurately as I understand the process too. 11 12 THE COURT: Well, with no objections I'm going 13 to take my robe off, so I can move around. 14 MR. BUTNER: Do you have no objection to that, Mr. Sears? 15 16 MR. SEARS: None that I want to make at this 17 time. THE COURT: Good. You're proposal is simply 18 19 to go through this, Mr. Butner? 20 MR. BUTNER: Correct, Judge. Actually. probably the best would be not to start with this bunch 21 22 here unless there's no objection to crime scene 23 photographs, per se, as being gruesome. MS. CHAPMAN: I think there are some crime 24 25 scene photographs --

THE COURT REPORTER: Your Honor, can we pause
because I'm going to try and move closer.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BUTNER: Speaking I guess I could use
this. One of these. Just pull one out and use it.
Speaking for the record now we're on
MS. CHAPMAN: Just one second, I think.
MR. SEARS: Judge, under the circumstances I
think that we would be willing to waive Mr. DeMocker's
presence so he could be taken back if that's acceptable
with the Court.
THE COURT: That's acceptable to me. I
respect that.
Let me say, Mr. DeMocker, you obviously have a
right to be present at all of the proceedings in your
case. You're willing to waive your presence for purposes
of our going through the photographs?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.
THE COURT: I'll accept the waiver, find that
it is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
I'll excuse Mr. DeMocker.
THE DETENTION OFFICE: Is that for the
remainder of the morning?
THE COURT: It's the remainder of the day.
The next hearing that he's present at is, I believe,

1	Friday at 9.
2	(The Defendant exited the courtroom.)
3	MR. SEARS: Thank you, Your Honor.
4	MS. CHAPMAN: Okay. So we're on
5	MR. BUTNER: K.
6	MS. CHAPMAN: disk
7	MR. BUTNER: This is Disk L and then there's
8	only one photo on this first page that we're talking
9	about. I don't know that we need what I would suggest
10	is that your just flip through these and then say which
11	ones you have a problem with.
12	Does that make sense?
13	MS. CHAPMAN: It's only the ones that you have
14	tagged?
15	MR. BUTNER: No well, yeah. The tags are
16	on all of the crime scene photos that have a picture of
17	the body. That's what I attempted to do, was to sort them
18	out that way so that
19	MR. SEARS: To understand, Judge, we had asked
20	the State to bring photos of the crime scene that depicted
21	the victim's body of the autopsy of the post-autopsy
22	session with the golf club where they brought the body out
23	and then the skull reconstruction by Dr. Fulginiti.
24	And so I think that what I'm seeing is it
25	looks like you brought all of the crime scene photos and

1	then went back and used yellow post-its to mark the ones
2	that have the body in it?
3	MR. BUTNER: That's exactly, right.
4	MR. SEARS: Let me ask this, if we have no
5	objection, this is going to go the ones would go into
6	the pool of potential photos. We're not agreeing today
7	that we would waive any foundational or other objections
8	that we have to them, just we're just here talking
9	about the gruesome prejudicial affect.
10	MR. BUTNER: Exactly.
11	MR. SEARS: Okay. Got you.
12	MR. BUTNER: No waiver as to foundation or
13	accumulative or anything like that.
14	MS. CHAPMAN: So we'll just take this and
15	review it?
16	MR. BUTNER: Right.
17	MS. CHAPMAN: Yeah?
18	MR. BUTNER: Yeah. That's fine.
19	MR. SEARS: Maybe that's the simplest way to
20	do it.
21	MS. CHAPMAN: It would be quicker.
22	MR. BUTNER: Here's the method to my madness.
23	You see little tabs on the top and little tabs on the
24	bottom, and then these tabs on the side. I tried to tab
25	the individual photographs from the top and bottom and

```
then where I just looked at it and it was all four, I just
 1
 2
    put one on the side.
 3
                MS. CHAPMAN:
                              Okay.
 4
                MR. BUTNER:
                             Okay?
 5
                MR. SEARS:
                            Okay. Got you.
                              So we're also not going to make
 6
                MS. CHAPMAN:
 7
    any objections as to the cumulativeness of it because
 8
    right now -- we'll be doing that at another time.
 9
                MR. BUTNER:
                             Right. I'm sure you would.
10
                (Mr. Sears and Ms. Chapman confer.)
                THE COURT REPORTER: Your Honor, do you want
11
12
    me to report this?
13
                THE COURT: Yes.
                THE COURT REPORTER: Mr. Sears -- I can't hear
14
15
    Mr. Sears.
                THE COURT: So if you make a statement,
16
    Mr. Sears, will you keep you voice up?
17
18
                MR. SEARS: I'm sorry. That was intended to
19
    be a remark between the two of us.
20
                THE COURT: Or those that you want to be on
    the record, keep your voice up.
21
22
                MR. SEARS: I'm sorry.
23
                (Mr. Sears and Ms. Chapman confer.)
2.4
                THE COURT: Do you care if they make a mark on
25
    your tab?
```

1	MR. BUTNER: No. Yeah, if you want to, you
2	can put a little mark on the yellow tab. If there's, you
3	know, if you think that you need to object to that
4	particular photo, I don't have any problem with that.
5	MS. CHAPMAN: Okay. Thank you.
6	MR. BUTNER: Sure.
7	MS. CHAPMAN: So looking at Disk F3 of three
8	Photograph Numbered 4747 and then proceeding onto 4750,
9	4749, 4748, and 4751. These are all photographs that we
10	would object to as being gruesome.
11	I'm not sure, Joe, when we were speaking about
12	this, you said that you might not be interested this
13	these. I don't know if we need to continue. These are
14	photographs after the body has been moved.
15	MR. BUTNER: Go ahead and just state those
16	things for the record, if you would, and I think that I
17	can respond for the record too.
18	MS. CHAPMAN: I think she's got it on the
19	record. So you can respond.
20	MR. BUTNER: Yeah, I know, but we have to
21	write them down.
22	MS. CHAPMAN: So you want me to repeat what I
23	just said?
24	MR. BUTNER: Would you, please. Don't say it
25	so fast.

1	MS. CHAPMAN: Sure. F3 of 3 is the disk and
2	the Imagine Numbers 4747, 4750, 4749, 4748, and 4751,
3	4754.
4	Even these?
5	MR. SEARS: Yeah.
6	MS. CHAPMAN: 4752, 4753, 4755, 4758, 4757,
7	4756. M.AM(MR. SEARS: Uh-huh.
8	
9	MS. CHAPMAN: Let's start with that as a bunch
10	and it's a grouping of the victim's body in a body bag.
11	MR. BUTNER: Is this where it begins?
12	MS. CHAPMAN: I believe it begins here
13	(indicating).
14	MR. BUTNER: Okay. And that's
15	THE COURT: Actually, they've objected to 4747
16	all the way through 58.
17	MR. BUTNER: Okay. I wouldn't be offering
18	4747. Now, let me back up on that statement for just a
19	moment. It appears to me that these particular
20	photographs, first of all, they depict the victim in the
21	body bag and so, really, of course, the body has been
22	moved. And it's not an autopsy photo. I think that the
23	primary purpose of the photographs at this juncture is
24	purely identification purposes, and if that's the case,
25	I'm assuming we're not going to have a problem with

identification in this case?

MR. SEARS: I don't imagine we would.

MR. BUTNER: Okay. So 4747 I don't have a problem with withdrawing that photo or 4748 or 4749, 4750, 4751. The State won't be offering any of those. 4752, 53, and 55 I do not think are gruesome photographs. It would be this (indicating) photo, this (indicating) photo, and this (indicating) photo.

THE COURT: Numbers again?

MR. BUTNER: I should just say 4752, 4753, 4754 and 4755. 522, and 53, I don't believe are gruesome photographs. They just depict, basically, the lower portion of the victim's body. Her left leg -- left leg view from both sides. And I don't have any objection to 54 and 55 not being offered, so to speak.

In regard to 52 and 53 the only reason that I can conceive of them being offered is that there was some discussion in Dr. Keen's testimony about this what appears to be an abrasion on the left side of the leg and I would think that these might be relevant for that purpose because there was -- I can't remember exactly what it was about.

THE COURT: My view of 5253 is that they are not gruesome.

MS. CHAPMAN: And 55?

1	MR. BUTNER: I'm not offering.
2	MS. CHAPMAN: Okay.
3	MR. BUTNER: And 54 I'm not offering. Okay.
4	We went on, didn't we, through 58 as I recall?
5	THE COURT: Yes.
6	MR. BUTNER: I don't think that 58 is
7	gruesome. I don't think 56 is gruesome and I don't think
8	that 57 is gruesome either, and so I will just tell you
9	that I don't think that I'll be offering those but if
10	those photos were to be offered, it's likely that the
11	purpose that they would be offered is, again, that mark on
12	her left leg and, of course, it's not I'm not going to
13	need, you know, five or six or seven photos of have that
14	but likely it would only require one, maybe two at the
15	most. So
16	THE COURT: I don't conclude that those are
17	particularly gruesome either; 56, 57, 58.
18	MS. CHAPMAN: And is 59 one that you had
19	marked or do we need to discuss 59?
20	MR. BUTNER: I left it marked because it's a
21	crime scene photograph and I'm not exactly sure what the
22	heck even that stuff is right there (indicating) at this
23	point.
24	MR. SEARS: Those appear to be items that were
25	on the floor near the body. You can see the body bag in

1 the top of the picture. I think that's just what's left there after the body is moved. 2 3 MR. BUTNER: I think you're right but I don't know that and so, you know, I'm just sort of leaving that 4 alone, so to speak. It certainly isn't a gruesome 5 photograph at least from my point. 6 7 MR. SEARS: My thinking on all of the 8 photographs that depict part of the body bag was that the 9 concept of a person being taken away in a bag and is --10 has some inherent gruesome aspect to it. Doesn't add 11 anything to the case and I think that Mr. Butner is right, 12 there are objections we would make on other grounds, other 13 than gruesomeness later, but that's what I was thinking 14 when we discussed all of these pictures. They were all of 15 the pictures that showed the body bag. 16 THE COURT: So noted. 17 MS. CHAPMAN: I believe that we have now completed a review of this binder and can move to the 18 19 other one. 20 MR. BUTNER: I'll have you know I'm taking 21 very good care of this. 22 MS. CHAPMAN: Indeed. So this is Disk C. 23 THE COURT: If you get a few coherent pages at a time and want to go through them in that fashion that 24 25 would be great.

1 MS. CHAPMAN: Okay.

(Mr. Sears and Ms. Chapman confer.)

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, I think we would object. This is -- see if we can identify this first page. This is Disk --

MS. CHAPMAN: -- C 2978, 2979, 2980, and 2981. Let's take those four. I think we would object to those four photographs as gruesome. Also noting that the measurement used there had is an Odontology ruler and not one properly used for skull measurements.

MR. BUTNER: Okay. I believe that as nearly always I can tell that these are all -- first of all, of course, there's photo of the victim but, secondly, they are four separate photos of four separate wounds to the victim's skull and the measuring device is there to demonstrate, of course, some degree of accuracy the size of the wound, and to that extent, I think, that each of these are relevant and they are not so gruesome as to be in some fashion prejudicial and they have significant probative value because this is a scientific examination by the ME of these injuries to the victim's head.

MS. CHAPMAN: Well, it certainly appears that 2980 and 2979 are measuring potentially the same wound, and we're looking at the -- on those two photographs, the victim's head with her hair pulled back looking down

1	inside what appears to be underneath the skull.
2	And in 2978 we're look at the victim's eye and
3	abrasion above her eye.
4	I can't tell what 2981 appears to depict.
5	MR. BUTNER: You know, you're right. You
6	clarified that for me because I was thinking that they
7	were four separate ones. And 79 and 80 are of the same
8	wound, I guess, probably
9	MR. SEARS: Hang on a second.
10	(An unidentified person enters and
11	exits the courtroom.)
12	MS. CHAPMAN: Okay.
13	MR. BUTNER: Probably one of those would
14	THE COURT: Off the record.
15	(Whereupon a discussion was held
16	off the record.)
17	THE COURT: Back on the record.
18	MR. BUTNER: Probably one of those photos
19	would suffice because we would only need one, of course,
20	to measure that wound and, I guess, I'm not in a position
21	to say which one is, you know, less gruesome.
22	THE COURT: As between the two, 79 and 80,
23	they do appear to cover the same wound. It's difficult
24	for me to identify as well whether 2981 is the same or
25	different based on the nature involved in the photograph.

They are not unduly gruesome in terms of identifying the wound but I would not allow multiple photographs of the same thing to be used in an effort to minimize the prejudicial nature of it. They are described accurately by Miss Chapman and what she said on the

record.

78 I also would not find unduly gruesome for purposes of showing the entry that was testified to by Dr. Keen. So I find it probative. Again, I'm probably not going to allow multiple photographs of the same wound for each of these. I don't think that 78 in particular is particularly inflammatory.

I don't think, frankly, either side is disputing the death or more in particular what caused the death. However, neither do I think that the case needs to be tried in a vacuum without the jury being able to identify and see for themselves what the nature of the wounds were.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, if I could make one further objection to 79 as opposed to 80, if one of the purposes of 80 is to orient the wound to, for example, a location above the victim's left ear, you can see that ear in a close-up in 80.

. What is disturbing to us is the need to show the wound but then to show other portions of the

victim's body and her face and her facial features that 1 2 has inflammatory connotation. 3 If we're looking at looking at the size -- I 4 mean, we want to know the size and other characteristics 5 of the wound, a close-up of the wound particularly in 80 that has the ear there so that Dr. Keen could orient that 6 7 wound to a location in the skull. So we would object to 79 because it 8 gratuitously shows the left side of the victim's face and 9 the back and shoulders. 10 11 THE COURT: I understand that. I agree with you on some of your observations about 79 compared to 80. 12 13 The other fact of 79 is that the ruler is not as easily 14 able to be read compared to 80. 15 As I said, I don't find -- I don't find them to be unduly inflammatory prejudicial or gruesome but as 16 between the two, if there's a selection, I think that 80 17 18 is less objectionable than 79 is, but I don't know what 19 the need may be. I won't allow both photographs --20 MR. BUTNER: I understand, Judge. 21 THE COURT: -- unless there's some distinction 22 that's shown --MR. BUTNER: I'll pick one --23 THE COURT: -- in the presentation. 24 25 MR. BUTNER: -- at the time of trial.

1	MR. SEARS: I just think 81 is unclear. I
2	think you can't tell what it is.
3	MR. BUTNER: 84 is the one that would be used.
4	I only tabbed that picture above and that's just to show
5	the injuries on the upper right portion of the victim's
6	body near the area of the neck and shoulder and shoulder
7	blade.
8	THE COURT: Objections 84?
9	MR. SEARS: I'm trying to see what this
10	(indicating) would be. Her right shoulder blade, her
11	back, that's her neck there (indicating), and her head. I
12	don't have a gruesomeness objection as to that.
13	THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you go through
14	and we can resume our way of showing these.
15	MR. SEARS: Is that maybe I'm missing
16	you would offer all?
17	MR. BUTNER: No.
18	MR. SEARS: Just the tabbed ones?
19	MS. CHAPMAN: C 2985, 2983, and 2982, would
20	not be offered.
21	MR. BUTNER: Correct.
22	MR. SEARS: These (indicating)? Okay.
23	MS. CHAPMAN: And with respect to this page,
24	Joe, 2986, 2989, and 2987 would also not be offered?
25	MR. BUTNER: No. 2986 would be offered and

1 2989 would be offered. 2 MS. CHAPMAN: Okay. Thank you. 3 MR. SEARS: Your Honor, I would object to 4 2986. There is no need to depict anything other than what 5 we talked about in terms of these markings on her upper It's a matter of privacy and respect for the 6 right thigh. 7 If we could -- if you want to offer that item, if victim. you'd cropped it so as to not show her naked -- trying to 8 9 think --THE COURT: 10 Butt. MR. SEARS: -- buttocks area. There you go. 11 12 I was trying to think of a better word. That's the actual 13 word. MR. BUTNER: To clarify that, there's actually 14 15 different ways to crop but I'm way looking at that thinking because of the injury extends up the side of the 16 thigh and along the side of the buttocks, I could crop it 17 18 in a lengthwise fashion, so to speak, to prohibit viewing 19 of the left cheek, so to speak. 20 MR. SEARS: Okay. 21 MR. BUTNER: But allow viewing of the portion 22 of the right cheek, so to speak, that demonstrates the 23 complete injury. 24 MR. SEARS: Doing it the way you're doing it 25 here (indicating), which is to mask, essentially, the left

half of the photograph or as the Judge is doing it, at an 1 2 angle maybe that's the easiest way and you can understand that that's the right leg and not the left leg but to the 3 extent that they could be cropped in some acceptable 4 fashion to afford her some privacy, then I don't object on 5 6 gruesomeness grounds. 7 THE COURT: On 2986 I don't find it gruesome but I find that it would be important to be respectful to 8 9 the decedent in cropping the photograph. 10 MR. BUTNER: Okay. I think I can do that without much difficulty and I'll tell you what photograph. 11 12 Pretty much like that (indicating). 13 The only thing -- we need that there because 14 that continues in that area, you know. MS. COWELL: Okay. All right. I can move 15 16 that back out. 17 MR. SEARS: On 2989, Your Honor, I can't tell 18 from this photograph which injury this is and whether it 19 is -- at which stage in the autopsy it's done. My guess, 20 is because there is still so much hair shown here that 21 it's before the scalp is reflected. I can see an ear in the photograph but I just can't tell from that photograph 22 23 if whether it is the same wound that we saw in earlier photographs above the left ear. 24

MR. BUTNER: You know, I understand that, and

I couldn't tell either. In fact, I recall having this same problem when I was examining Dr. Keen on the witness stand at the Chronis hearing and I needed him to explain to me which side we were dealing with. And so, I believe, that I need some photograph because I believe that it is a separate injury than the ones we've already been looking at.

THE COURT: Well, I have a question as to 2989. It's difficult for me to make a ruling with regard to that not knowing the purpose for which it might be sought. It appears, in general, to be somewhat gruesome and I may preclude it on that basis unless there is a good reason to use that.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, to clarify what the reason would be it's to demonstrate -- if you'll recall Dr. Keen's testimony there were -- he said that she was beaten basically around her head, so to speak, and on both sides of her head, and then as I understood it, across the back -- upper back of her head and then, of course, there were those facial injuries that are much more easy to see because there's no hair there. And think this is one of those separate discreet injuries that occurred in the beating process and so that's why it would be offered.

MR. SEARS: May I just suggest we don't have foundation for that, at this point, without something more

1 from Dr. Keen, I think we're all guessing that's a 2 photograph of her. 3 MR. BUTNER: Absolutely. 4 MR. SEARS: If the State can't articulate a 5 reason and the Court finds it inherently gruesome I would 6 ask that the Court not permit it. If the State has additional foundation on that one photo, I don't think 7 that it would be terribly disruptive of the trial to deal 8 9 with that as it comes up if the State and Dr. Keen conclude that it's essential to tell the story in this 10 11 case. 12 THE COURT: I believe that it's prima facie I'll put it that way without -- I don't know 13 14 that it's able to be excluded on that basis but -- so I 15 will need an articulated reason for admitting it. Otherwise I'm going to preclude it. 16 17 MS. CHAPMAN: Okay. 18 THE COURT: I expect without needing to 19 vocalize it with regard to any particular picture that we can -- the State is likely to crop these in a fashion that 20 21 exclude body parts for which normally there is covering in 22 privacy. 23 MR. BUTNER: Exactly. And just for the record what we're taking about at this point, Judge, is 2.4

25

Photograph 99.

1	THE COURT: 2992.
2	MR. BUTNER: 2992 off of I forget the disk
3	number.
4	MS. CHAPMAN: Disk C.
5	THE COURT: C.
6	MR. BUTNER: 2992, yes, it would be cropped to
7	cover the victim's lower portion of the torso and her
8	upper portion of the torso but leaving her arm in the
9	picture with this rod like object and the ME's hand in the
10	photograph.
11	THE COURT: Same true of 2991?
12	MR. BUTNER: Exactly, same true of that.
13	THE COURT: In terms of gruesomeness if that's
14	done, I don't know find that either 2992 or 2991 are
15	gruesome.
16	MS. CHAPMAN: So we would
17	THE COURT: 2990.
18	MR. SEARS: Can you tell us without Dr. Keen
19	what has been done to that wound and why that photograph
20	is necessary?
21	MR. BUTNER: I cannot.
22	MR. SEARS: I think that it is particularly
23	gruesome. It may have some forensic or medical basis but
24	if we don't have it today, I would object.
25	THE COURT: Well, I think that basically 2990

is prima facie gruesome and, again, I would need some 1 2 additional foundation laid or some understanding of what 3 the probative value is, if any, to allow it to be used in 4 the fashion in which the whole picture is showing. 5 may be some things that could be done to redact portions 6 of it to make it more acceptable to the defense and to the 7 Court. 8 MR. SEARS: Your Honor, on the next page 2997, 9 2995, and 29944 (sic). Particularly 29 --10 THE COURT: 2994. 11 MR. SEARS: 2995 and 2997 the State has indicated are -- I remember Dr. Keen's testimony about 995 12 13 as being his attempt to put pieces of the skull back together. It's not a scientific exercise. He actually 14 15 talked about putting Steroform in the skull. In view of the more professional work done by Dr. Fulginiti, this is 16 17 a particularly gruesome photograph, particularly since it 18 depicts the victim's ear and her hair and doesn't add 19 anything of probative value to the case. 20 In 2997 I remember some testimony from Dr. Keen about that but that is, thus far, the most 21 22 gruesome picture that I've see in among those and absent

foundation from Dr. Keen here this morning, I would ask

the Court to make some rulings with respect to the

gruesomeness of 997 and 995.

23

24

994 is a picture of hands and an Odontology 1 2 scale and there's discoloration and maybe a laceration but 3 it is so unclear that all it does is just show in a 4 gruesome fashion the victim's head with nothing of any 5 probative value. Again, unless the State is prepared to make an 6 7 offer on 994 as to what that depicts and why it's relevant 8 and why it's necessary --9 THE COURT: 2994 I don't have find especially 2995 and 2997 I could find gruesome and would 10 not admit them until there's some probative value that 11 12 outweighs the prejudicial effect and I think that I need 13 testimony with regard to that. So I'll find prima facie they are gruesome. 14 15 MR. BUTNER: And just to clarify the record I 16 believe that in regard to Photo 2994 that depicts one more 17 separate blow to the victim's head. 18 MR. SEARS: 0h. This one? THE COURT: 3000, 3001, 299. 19 20 MR. SEARS: 3000 and 2998 are the ones marked 21 on this page. And I think that if 3000 were cropped -- I 22 think it's an attempt to show injuries to the mouth. 23 THE COURT: Uh-huh. And perhaps the jaw but I don't 24 MR. SEARS: 25 think there is any need to show the victim's upper torso

or her nose in 3000, and unless this photograph were cropped, I think that it is unnecessarily gruesome and not descriptive of anything that the jury would need to see.

On 2998 that is, again, another dissection photograph. I can't in any way tell the Court that I know what that is. The victim didn't sustain, to my understanding, any internal injuries to the -- other than to the skull. I can't tell looking at that what that depicts but to the extent that there is the typical dissection of the torso and the abdomen and all of the other parts for which there are injuries, I think all of those are -- I understand why they're photographed but they are relevant and they are exceedingly gruesome and absent some foundation that explains to the Court what 2998 is I think we today find that to be gruesome and inadmissible.

MR. BUTNER: Just to clarify on 2998 I remember what Dr. Keen testified about in regard to this, and that was that this particular photo, and others like it, show the injuries to the base of the skull of the victim, and the fact that bones were shattered down in the bottom of her skull and pulling -- she's pulling the top part of the skull back to demonstrate that fact in this particular photograph.

These other photos across the page, so to

1	speak, and you'll get to them in a moment, are the pieces
2	of skull that were extracted from down in there
3	(indicating). Some of the pieces and some of the other
4	pieces I think. That's why I think that photo is
5	necessary.
6	THE COURT: 3000 I don't find to be gruesome.
7	2998 I find to be prima facie gruesome. I
8	think that they're an unnecessary. I think that there can
9	be description without showing that intimate detail to the
10	jury. So I would preclude 2998 unless you make some real
11	showing of necessity at the time of the trial or for that.
12	MR. BUTNER: And I'll just take this one
13	(indicating) instead of that one (indicating) because and
14	when I say this one
15	THE COURT: This one is 3004, is the bone
16	fragments from the base of the skull.
17	MR. BUTNER: That's my understanding.
18	THE COURT: So
19	MR. BUTNER: I don't know if there was an
20	objection even to that.
21	MR. SEARS: I don't have a gruesomeness
22	objection to that.
23	THE COURT: So no gruesomeness ruling on 3004?
24	MR. SEARS: Correct.
25	THE COURT: 3004 is admissible on the only

grounds that we're dealing with today which is the 1 2 gruesomeness. 3 MR. SEARS: We don't have any objection to 3007 or 3006 on gruesomeness grounds subject to the 4 5 State's assurance that any unnecessary portions of the 6 victim's body would be cropped out of these photos. 7 can't clearly see what's being shown there. I can see, for example, 3008 which is a portion of her right breast 8 but I don't see that same portion in 06 or 07. 9 10 THE COURT: Accounting possibly for the 11 selection. So 3006 and 3007 are admissible on 12 gruesomeness grounds. 13 MR. BUTNER: Before we move along I was just 14 getting a point of clarification, if I may, to go back to 3000 -- I hadn't had 3001. It was 3000 that I had tabbed. 15 16 And the Court ruled that that was not gruesome as I 17 understood? THE COURT: Correct. 3015, assuming that you 18 can crop that, I would not find it to be gruesome. 19 20 MR. SEARS: And we have no objection subject 21 to appropriate cropping or -- and that's the only one that 22 you're not offering, 14. 23 MR. BUTNER: Okay. 24 MR. SEARS: On -- are we on the same disk now? 25 MS. CHAPMAN: R.

MR. SEARS: R, as in Roger, there's -- let's see, three photographs on this page 004, 003, and 002. My understanding of the purpose of these photos, these are from the event a number of days post-autopsy where a golf club was brought in and positioned against the victim's arm and the victim's body was brought out in a body bag.

I would object. I don't know how you crop these photos. The sole purpose of these photos, as I understand them, if there's any probative value, these photos being these three items matching, it is to show the linear abrasions on her right arm and the area on her right biceps or right arm above the elbow with respect to the golf club.

Obviously, we're going to have many objections to the fact of the golf club if the purpose of these photos -- they are extremely disturbing and gruesome because they show the standard Y incision and, of course, the victim's nude body. Some of these show the victim's -- this one photograph -- well, it's not being offered.

I don't know how you would crop these photographs to completely cover the Y incision because of the position of the arm, and unless the State can demonstrate here today how they would do that and considering what these photos would be offered for, I would object to all three of these as being exceptionally

1 gruesome photos. 2 MR. BUTNER: Let's just say I'm offering all four then, Mr. Sears --3 4 MR. SEARS: Okay. 5 MR. BUTNER: -- just for clarification. MR. SEARS: The fourth would be 0001. 6 7 MR. BUTNER: So it's 0001, 0002, 0003, 0004. 8 And, of course, the purposes is to demonstrate how a golf club would likely be the instrument that caused these 9 10 types of injuries apparent on the victim's body as, in 11 essence, analyzed by the ME. He being the one that 12 suggested that a golf club was a likely type of instrument 13 that caused those injuries. 14 I think, with the cropping, as I'm sort of doing with my hands right now on that one picture 001, 15 16 that we could demonstrate that such an instrumentality as a golf club might have caused the injury and still protect 17 the victim's privacy as much as possible -- and let me 18 19 look the at 0003. THE COURT: Okay. My finding would be on 20 21 0001, 2, 3 and 4, respectively, that if appropriately 22 cropped they would not be gruesome. If they are not 23 cropped, they would be and so I'll direct that if you 24 intend to use those, they be cropped in a position that

would exclude the Y incision, the common place in

1 autopsies. 2 MR. SEARS: And just to be clear so that -- if 3 we can go back to these, that we would have a number of 4 others objections because the body has changed 5 significantly over time and injuries and things are different than they appeared at the time of death and the 6 7 time of autopsy. 8 THE COURT: Only dealing with the gruesome 9 decision. MR. SEARS: 10 Right. 11 Before we go back to that, just MR. BUTNER: as a point of clarification, conferring with my assistant 12 13 beside me, and she being sophisticated in the ways of 14 cropping and brushing on a computer, she said in regard to 15 -- for example, this one right here (indicating) we could 16 brush this autopsy incision away. 17 Would that be appropriate as decided by the 18 Court? 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 Okav. Thank you. MR. BUTNER: MR. SEARS: We're now looking at -- on Page 21 22 there's 007 and 006 which are photographs, again, at this 23 post-mortem reconstruction and the problem with these 24 photographs and the reason they are extraordinarily

gruesome is that the victim's face is severely distorted

not from the injuries but merely has a result of the autopsy and the changes in skin tension once you reflect the scalp forward and then pull it back it creates this ghoulish and ghastly change in the victim's face.

Looking at this you can't tell from these photographs, these two photographs, they're just golf clubs laid up against the victim's skull. They may have thought they were depicting something in those photographs but there's no scale. There's nothing about either of these photographs that shows anything that could possibly be of probative of any fact because they cover the injury and I don't see a way to ever redact these photographs to leave something there that would be useful to the jury without at the same time it being unduly suggestive of what this event was.

You know, the Court will hear a great deal about Macob (phonetic) and the unnecessary nature here, but we have a real problem with that. And when we get over to the photographs of 0012, and 0011, again, these are close-ups of the same event with golf clubs laid up against the victim's skull.

O012 shows the scalp reflected forward.

Again, I think forward. I can't tell. Yeah, I guess it is based on the shape of the ear. O011 you can see the scalp reflected but you can't tell what it was and this is

a very clumsy attempt to reconstruct some event and it 1 focuses on the skull. And 0011 is put back together 2 3 Perhaps these are very troubling photographs and because they add nothing to the event they are just 4 5 gratuities and gruesome in on our view and we would object. 6 7 MR. BUTNER: Actually, I would like to suggest 8 that the State would offer all four here on 0010. 9 THE COURT: 9, 10, 11, and 12. MR. BUTNER: And 008 also. So I'm assuming 10 11 you have the same objection to all of those? 12 MR. SEARS: We do. 13 MR. BUTNER: I would address those as follows, this is the ME demonstrating in each one of the these 14 separate injuries to the skull. First, he shows the 15 injury, then he shows how the golf club fits that 16 17 particular injury. Again, he shows the injury, how the 18 golf club fits the injury. The injury, how the golf club 19 fits the injury, and each one of those. 20 And I would think that with -- and 21 understanding the nature of the depiction of the victim's 22 face, with a cropping that I'm sort of demonstrating right here (indicating) to the Court, obscuring the victim's 23 face, that it would be possible and maybe even we could do 24

a cropping where we obscure in a kind of a box-type

fashion the victim's ear and the victim's face and we just show the ME with the golf club by the injury to the skull.

б

The golf club is similar to any type of instrument that caused that particular injury and I think we can do that with each of these photos. Sort of trying to demonstrate that for the record here. And I think that if, given the effort of the ME and his fashion, that I think these are appropriate in a scientific way to demonstrate that very likely, because of the manner in which the golf club fits the injury, that a golf club was the likely instrument that caused these injuries.

THE COURT: Well, I think my ruling would be on these as they currently exist would be unduly gruesome for purposes of the trial. If they are redacted and pertinent to testimony by Dr. Keen, they could be admissible if appropriately cropped, but as they currently exist, I wouldn't allow them.

The point it seems for the instruction of the photographs would be to show the possibility of the golf club being a golf club of a similar type being the source of the injuries. I think you can get that through testimony without doing a show-and-tell with the jury whether it's otherwise a reflected scalp in the condition of the body that it existed post-mortem.

So at this point I think that they're

CERTIFIED REPORTER

unfairly, unduly and prejudicially gruesome. So as they 1 2 currently stand I would not allow it and I would make the 3 same ruling with regard to 1315 and 16. MR. SEARS: And perhaps 17, Your Honor? 4 5 That's this one (indicating). THE COURT: And 17. 6 7 MR. BUTNER: Judge, if we might hold on these photographs for a moment because it seems to me that these 8 are extremely important photographs, and I'm particularly 9 10 looking at photographs 0016, 0015, and 0017 because the ME 11 is able to take the golf club and put it next to the skull 12 of the victim and demonstrate that there is an almost 13 exactly the same curvature to some of these fracture lines as that of the golf club and --14 15 THE COURT: So if appropriately redacted --16 that's why I said --17 MR. BUTNER: Okay. THE COURT: -- as they currently exist I think 18 that they are unduly gruesome. If they are redacted in a 19 20 fashion that modifies the photograph and could demonstrate 21 that in a way, that's not gruesome in a prejudicial way, 22 I'm not -- I think that there is a possibility with appropriate foundation that they could be used. 23 24 MR. SEARS: If I can just tell you -- I know 25 we're not talking about this today but our investigation

1	has let us to believe that there are some real
2	foundational problems with this experiment being conducted
3	on the skull after the autopsy. We'll take up and that
4	may address the gruesomeness question head on.
5	THE COURT: So to speak. In all four?
6	MR. BUTNER: Yeah. I think that I think
7	this was just for identification purposes, again, because
8	of the body bag and the tags and so forth and that's why I
9	just went like that (indicating) I'm not going to be
10	offering these photographs other than for identification
11	purposes which I think is not going to be an issue now.
12	MR. SEARS: This being 0821, 22, 23 and 24?
13	MR. BUTNER: Right.
14	MS. CHAPMAN: Were now referring to T.
15	MR. SEARS: T as in Tom.
16	MR. BUTNER: Yes.
17	THE COURT: So you don't mind that they'll be
18	offered?
19	MR. BUTNER: No. I'm trying to clarify the
20	record. I don't hear anything from the defense. We won't
21	have an identification issue here in terms of this being,
22	you know, the victim being taken to the ME and an autopsy
23	conducted there and that sort of thing.
24	MR. SEARS: I think that's extremely unlikely
25	and appropriate.

THE COURT: This is Disk T 821, 822, 823, 824. 1 2 The State does not believe they will be offered unless 3 there is a dispute about identity in which case I haven't 4 made a ruling yet with regard to gruesome. 5 MR. BUTNER: We've got a bunch more --THE COURT REPORTER: I can't hear you, 6 7 Mr. Butner. 8 MR. BUTNER: We have a bunch of photographs 9 that pertain to Dr. Fulginiti -- I apologize --10 think that I just went and tabbed at that point and said, 11 whoa, you know, we have a whole bunch. We just took a 12 look at these in mass, so to speak. 13 MR. SEARS: Do you want to keep on going? THE COURT: Finish what we can. 14 15 MR. SEARS: Okay. We are now on Desk -- on Disk T 0834 and 0835 are as best I can term it autopsy 16 17 photos taken fairly early in the stage based on the amount of the hair. The 0835 I think would require to be 18 19 You can see a portion of the victim's neck and cropped. 20 shoulders that's unnecessary. And in 0834 you can see, again, the victim's 21 22 ear and this seems to be a photograph taken of the same 23 large laceration. I think that must be the victim's left 24 ear looking at the same injury at a different angle and, of course, we're not talking about cumulative photographs,

but I think that cropped or uncropped 834 is particularly 1 2 gruesome and an unnecessary photograph. 3 And 835, again, seems to be cumulative but you can't see the scale very well. The photograph is taken 4 5 from some distance and to the fact that you can see a 6 portion of the victim's -- what appears to be the 7 victims's neck and back, I think it's an appropriately 8 gruesome photo and I would object to 835 on that ground. 9 THE COURT: MR Butner. 10 MR. BUTNER: Judge, 835 is one of those 11 separate discreet injuries that we mentioned before and I don't think it's depicted in any other photographs. 12 Certainly, we can crop it so that the victim's face or 13 neck area is not in the photograph and I don't think that 14

THE COURT: Well, I don't particularly see the gruesomeness on 835. What about 4?

it's gruesome beyond that point.

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. BUTNER: 834, I think that that also can be cropped to simply show the injury. I'm not sure if that's the same injury as what was depicted in some other photos of injury right by the left ear. If it is, of course, it would be duplicated of those and would not be used because it's going to be cumulative.

THE COURT: Well, I think 834 seems prima facie gruesome and it appears also covered by other

photographs. Although, as you say I am less certain as to that but I think it was one of your earlier photographs as well.

So I think that 834 is gruesome and it won't be allowed absent some real showing of need at the time and distinction from the photographs that are already in evidence.

MR. SEARS: This is Disk 27 and if I understand this, the State would propose all four photographs on this page?

MR. BUTNER: Correct.

MR. SEARS: Okay. 3704 is a photograph at autopsy looking directly at the victim's face. We have, and you can see injuries to her right eye, to her mouth and chin, and then the injury above her left eye and to her left eye those and the bridge of her nose, and there are other photographs already looked at that show, that is a particularly disturbing particular photograph because you also can't tell from this photograph what has been done.

This appears to be an incision line perhaps and her -- I just can't tell what this injury is or that might be the edge of a wound on her scalp but this is a particularly troubling and unnecessary photo because it shows the victim in full frontal view in death and if the

purpose of the photo is to show the injuries, each of these injuries have been documented in a far less gruesome and troubling way in other photographs.

THE COURT: I would not find 3704 to be especially gruesome. I'll reserve the issue of whether it's cumulative since I don't know to the extent that it may be offered versus other similar photos being offered.

MR. SEARS: 3703 seems to be, yet, another photo of this same laceration but here you can't tell from identifying photos. I think it's particularly gruesome, not probative or anything, probably also cumulative and the scales don't appear to be put in any particular place that would measure the wound itself.

and 3715 show the skull with the scalp reflected and exposed bone and would appear to be missing pieces of skull. I think that those are gruesome in and of themselves and I think they are unnecessary for some of same reasons that we've talked about with respect to some other photographs of the skull and I think they are much less gruesomely depicted in photographs taken by Dr. Fulginiti for the purpose to show fractures of the missing pieces.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: In regard to the Photograph 3703 I believe that's another injury to the head that we have

not depicted in photographs as yet and that's the reason that it is depicted.

I don't think it's gruesome because it's isolated so that you don't see the victim's face or anything like that but you are able to see the nature of the injury or injuries and I'm not exactly sure there maybe more than one here and will be necessary for Dr. Keen to testify about those particular injuries.

Should I going on to each one of these? THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BUTNER: In regard to Photographs Number 3713 and 3715 those photographs depict the number of fractures and pieces in which the victim's skull was reduced to, so to speak, as a result of the attack and it's an effort by the ME to show those injuries and the full extent of those injuries and it's true the skin is reflected away to demonstrate the injuries with the pieces kind of held together in place. I think that's necessary for the ME's testimony from a scientific basis.

THE COURT: I think 3703 to 3715, 3713 are prima facie gruesome not especially probative of any particular fact at issue and I think that other photographs with Dr. Fulginiti's assessment may provide the same and so I'm going to prima facie find that they're inflammatory and prejudicial and I think that there are

1	other photographers that could be substituted in instead		
2	of those.		
3	MR. BUTNER: For identification purposes as		
4	opposed to those ones		
5	THE COURT: You're not intending to		
6	MR. SEARS: I promise you we will not.		
7	MR. BUTNER: Okay. Thank you.		
8	MS. CHAPMAN: So this is just 35 now.		
9	THE COURT: Thank you.		
10	MR. BUTNER: And I don't know for sure how		
11	Dr. Fulginiti testifies. I have never had her on the		
12	stand but I have all of these tabbed and for the record		
13	THE COURT: Numbers.		
14	MR. BUTNER: they are going to be 0246		
15	no. I got the wrong number. I got letters.		
16	MS. CHAPMAN: Well, this is 0246 Y, 014, and		
17	this is 0246, maybe that's a V instead of Y 013, and then		
18	there's also 0246, 015, and 0246, 016.		
19	MR. BUTNER: Okay. So I would just call them		
20	014, 013, 015, and 016. They're offered to demonstrate		
21	apparently the process necessary in order to get to where		
22	Dr. Fulginiti can make her conclusions and to that extent		
23	that's my understanding of how they are necessary.		
24	THE COURT: 13, 14 and 15 I would find		
25	especially gruesome and probably not sufficient probative		

to authorize them. That may even be true of 016. I would need some showing through you and Dr. Fulginiti as to why that might be necessary.

I don't think that the process itself is necessarily important for the jurors. I think that to see a blow-by-blow sort of way, I think they can perhaps have some other exhibits that show the final conclusions based on her evaluation.

MR. BUTNER: All of the remainder of the photographs I am offering. I just didn't bother to go in and tab them because they are of the boiled, for the record, the boiled skull of the victim devoid of flesh and I believe that they show the various pieces and with measurements, of course, in place and, of course, to some extent they're probably going to be cumulative and I can't tell that because I don't know exactly how Dr. Fulginiti testifies or what she's doing with each one of these photographs. And I can -- go ahead.

THE COURT: In terms of our identifying them by number they range from the 08246 V 016. All the way through then -- through to 054?

MR. SEARS: Actually there is 013.

MR. BUTNER: Those will be --

THE COURT: But 16 I also made a preliminary ruling on but basically it's 17 and then sequentially it

1 looks like all the way through the last one being 054. MR. SEARS: Are there any gaps in the 2 3 numbering? 4 MR. BUTNER: I don't know. 5 MR. SEARS: Yeah, there are because it jumps from 025 to 026 but then there's 034, 035. So there are 6 7 gaps in numbering. Number of photos missing. 8 MS. CHAPMAN: Well, 24 is missing. Unless 9 it's some place else. 10 MR. SEARS: 25? 11 THE COURT: Okay. So to be more clear on the 12 record it goes from 16 through 23, skips to 4, and then it 13 goes 25, 26, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44. 14 All the way through 50. It skips 51 it looks like. And then it has 52, 53, 54. 15 16 MR. SEARS: I don't have any gruesomeness arguments with the possible exception of 17, seems to be 17 18 just a slightly different shot or maybe an identical shot 19 to 16 which the Court found could possibly be prima facie gruesome without additional foundation and part of the 20 process and unnecessary problematic in other areas. With 21 22 respect to the rest of these I don't think that I can see anything with respect to gruesomeness. 23 24 THE COURT: All right. Clearly, there may be

some other objections such as cumulative and the like?

1		MR. SEARS: Well, we don't even know the
2	purpose for	starters.
3		MR. BUTNER: Technical more than anything.
4		MR. SEARS: Likely.
5		MR. BUTNER: Well, that's what she told me at
6	some point,	I was going to say on the phone, but I think
7	she told me	in person, but I can't remember now.
8		MR. SEARS: Okay.
9		THE COURT: All right. That takes care of the
10	photos.	
11		MR. BUTNER: Thank you.
12		MR. SEARS: Thank you, Your Honor.
13		MS. CHAPMAN: Thank you.
14		MR. SEARS: Thanks for everybody for staying.
15		(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I, Lisa A. Chaney, a Certified Reporter, in the State of Arizona, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages 1 through 82 constitute a full, true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings had in the foregoing matter, all done to the best of my skill and ability. WITNESS my hand this 28th day of January, 2010. RPR, CSR, CR ertified Reporter Certificate No. 50801